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In the process of fiscal decentralization sub-central governments have gained access to different 
fiscal resources, but the autonomy in setting the taxes is a key issue when analyzing the degree of 
decentralization. In this paper we calculated an index of tax autonomy for the EU Member States 
based on the OECD methodology of classification of sub-central taxes according to the degree of 
control over these taxes. We have shown that the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations is 
significantly different among the Member States, and taking into consideration the discretion 
over sub-national taxes provides a valuable insight on the fiscal decentralization design. 
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Introduction 
When analyzing the degree of decentralization we must take into account two important aspects. 
First, it must be identified the division of responsibilities and resources between different levels 
of government. The degree of fiscal decentralization is, thus, determined by the volume and 
importance of responsibilities and revenue assigned to subnational governments. Second aspect, 
refers to distribution of decision-making powers, i.e., the degree to which decisions to collect and 
allocate  public  resources  are  decentralized.  A  state  in  which  local  authorities  have  a  real 
autonomy  in  allocating  their  expenditure  and  collecting  revenue  is  more  decentralized  than 
another  state  where  local  revenue  and  expenditure  are  set  centrally,  although  the  vertical 
distribution of public expenditure and revenue is identical in the two states (Stegărescu, 2005: 
304). 
The indicator most widely used in literature to measure the degree of fiscal decentralization is the 
share  of  local  expenditure  or  revenue  in  total  government  expenditure,  or,  respectively,  in 
consolidated general government revenue. Although it is an imperfect indicator of the degree of 
decentralization,  in  order  to  have  a  standard  variable,  calculated  on  the  basis  of  uniform 
definitions  among  states,  it  is  used  in  most  studies  on  the  causes  and  effects  of  fiscal 
decentralization (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002). This indicator’s major advantage is, on the one hand, 
the availability of statistical data, and, on the other hand, the comparability of the results. 
An  important  limit  of  this  indicator  refers  to  the  impossibility  of  determining  the  vertical 
structure of decision-making powers. It shows only the revenue and expenditure of subnational 
authorities, without providing any information on the decision regarding taxation and spending 
by  destinations.  Thus,  there  are  many  situations  where  some  public  spending  is  performed 
locally, but the expenditure destination is predetermined by the central government, and they 
appear in statistical data as expenditure of local government. Also, statistical data do not provide 
qualitative information on the nature of revenue included in local budgets, because they make no 
distinction between conditional and unconditional grants, or between tax levies independently  
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determined and imposed by national legislation. In the analysis of intergovernmental grants, is 
equally important the distinction between those allocated on the basis of objective criteria using 
allocation formulas, and those allocated on a discretionary basis. 
For these reasons, the share of revenue or expenditures of local budgets in general consolidated 
budget revenue or expenditure tends to overestimate the degree of fiscal decentralization. Thus, 
to capture more accurately the degree of decentralization, numerous studies over time have been 
introduced also non-fiscal variables. For example, Treisman (2002) in order to measure fiscal 
decentralization  has  used,  along  with  fiscal  variables,  a  number  other  variables  such  as:  the 
number  of  levels  of  government,  election  decentralization  or  even  the  share  of  local  public 
employees  in  total  government  employees.  Arzaghi  and  Henderson  (2005)  have  built  a 
decentralization index based on nine variables, including: the vertical structure of government, 
requirement that local or regional representatives are elected democratically, autonomy in setting 
local taxes or the ratio between conditional and unconditional transfers. 
In this framework, since the share of local revenue and expenditure in total public revenue and 
expenditure tends to overestimate the degree of fiscal decentralization, in order to have a more 
accurate descriptor a more detailed analysis of the structure of local tax revenue is necessary. 
 
OECD methodology for classification of tax revenues 
In the fiscal decentralization literature there have been several studies that have attempted to 
quantify the degree of fiscal autonomy of sub-central governments (Pola, 1999; Blankart, 2000; 
Stegărescu, 2005). Among them is the most detailed study is the one made by the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, Taxing Powers of State and Local Government, 
which provided a methodological framework for classification of sub-central taxes according to 
the degree of autonomy in their determination.  
The concept of “tax autonomy” captures various aspects of freedom sub-central governments 
have over their own taxes. It encompasses issues like sub-central government’s right to introduce 
or to abolish a tax, to set tax rates, to define the tax base, or to grant tax reliefs. In a number of 
states taxes are not assigned to one specific level of government but shared between the central 
and local governments. Such tax sharing measures deny a single local government any control on 
tax rates and bases, but collectively local authorities may negotiate the sharing formula with 
central  government.  Thus,  to  classify  the  sub-central  tax  levies  according  to  the  degree  of 
autonomy over them, must be taken into consideration: the powers conferred by law to local 
authorities to set tax rates, to evaluate the tax bases and to administrate the tax revenue.  
Assuming that only taxes that can be set independently and on which local authorities have 
legislative powers ensure real fiscal autonomy, tax revenues are classified into five categories 
depending on the degree of control over them. Categories are ranked in decreasing order from 
highest to lowest taxing power. Category (a) represents full power over tax rates and bases, (b) 
power over tax rates, (c) power over the tax base, (d) tax sharing arrangements, and (e) no power 
on rates and bases at all. In order to capture the more refined institutional details the (d) category 
was further divided into four subcategories to illustrate the many different rules for governments 
to determine and change their own share. 
Local or regional authorities have greater autonomy on revenue included in categories (a) to 
(d.2.) and on the other, from (d.3.) to (e) they have no control. Basically, the latter are very 
similar to intergovernmental grants. 
 
    
372 
Table 1 Classification of local taxes according to the degree of autonomy 
 
Source: OECD, Taxing Powers of State and Local Government, OECD Tax Policy Studies, nr.1, 
1999, pp.11. 
 
The study mentioned above preceded to allocation of tax revenues in each of the five categories, 
and then to calculate the percentage of each category in total, achieving such a detailed structure 
of tax revenue according to the degree of autonomy in setting them. Of course, this grouping of 
tax revenue does not fully reflect the degree of local financial autonomy. For example, even if 
local authorities can determine both the level of tax rates and the tax base, such autonomy may be 
restricted  by  law,  imposing  certain  limits  that  they  can  choose  tax  rates  between  or  some 
assessment criteria of the tax base and, in this case, the revenue generated by these taxes are still 
falling into category (a). However, we believe that this methodology for the classification of tax 
levies is a very useful tool to assess local autonomy. 
 
The structure of local and regional taxes in the EU Member States 
The structure of public sector internal financial relations and tax legislation differs greatly from 
one state to another. For this reason, it is impossible to use uniform rules for allocating tax 
revenues between the five categories. To ensure proper division of taxes, in addition to a detailed 
structure of tax revenues, also knowledge of tax law provisions in each state is necessary. 
Since  1999,  the  Organization  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  publishes 
periodically  in  the  report  entitled  “Fiscal  Relations  Across  Government  Levels”  detailed 
information on the structure of tax revenue in OECD member states. Thus, we used the results 
from its latest publication, “The Fiscal Autonomy of Sub-Central Governments: An Update”, 
2009, for Member States of the European Union. The latest revenue structure, extracted from the 
mentioned report, is that for the year 2005. For countries that are not part of the OECD, we have 
taken information from an earlier report, “Fiscal Decentralization in EU Applicant States and 
Selected EU Member States”. It was completed to evaluate the status of fiscal decentralization in 
states that joined the European Union after 2004. 
To ensure comparability of results achieved in the case of Romania, with EU Member States we 
calculated the structure of tax revenue for 2005 and 2000 to show their evolution. Thus, we 
classified each type of tax in one of five categories, then, using data on local budgets from the 
Statistical Yearbook of 2007, we calculated the percentage of each category in total.  
 
The tax autonomy index 
Using the calculated structure of tax revenue we built an index of tax autonomy for the EU 
Member States. The index’s values indicate the degree of local and regional governments control 
over their own tax revenues, ranging from 1, signifying a complete autonomy in determining 
(a)  SCG set the tax rate and the tax base; 
(b)  SCG set the tax rate only; 
(c)  SCG set the tax base only; 
(d)  Tax sharing arrangements:  
    (d.1.)  SCG decide the revenue split; 
    (d.2.)  Revenue split can be changed only with the consent of SCG’s; 
    (d.3.)  Revenue  split  may  be  changed  unilaterally  by  a  higher  level 
government (by legislation); 
    (d.4.)  Revenue  split  may  be  changed  unilaterally  by  a  higher  level 
government (determined annually by budget laws) 
(e)  CG determines tax rate and tax base.  
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local taxes, and 0, no control over taxes, i.e. all taxes are set by the central government. In this 
setting, we multiplied the shares of each taxes that fall in the (a) category with 1.00, (b) with 0.8, 
then, categories (c) to (e) with 0.7, 0.6, 0.5, 0.3, 0.2, 0, and, respectively, 0.1. For federal states 
we calculated an average of indices obtained at regional and local level, weighted by the tax 
revenue volume raised by these two levels of government.  
 
Figure 1 Tax autonomy index in the EU Member States 
 
 
As shown in Figure 1, there are significant differences in terms of fiscal autonomy of local and 
regional  governments  in  the  EU  Member  States.  In  Lithuania  and  Latvia  all  local  taxes  are 
determined by the central level, while in Luxembourg, local authorities enjoy almost complete 
freedom to set taxes. In this state 98.5% of local tax revenues are in category (a), local authorities 
having  exclusive  competence  to  determine  tax  rates  and  tax  bases.  Other  states  where  local 
authorities have greater control over local taxes are France, Britain, Netherlands and Sweden. 
In Romania, the index increased from 0.2022 in the year 2000 to a value of 0.2825 in 2005. The 
most important factor contributing to this change is represented by changing the methodology for 
determining the share of splitting the income tax, which in 2000 could be modified through the 
annual state budget law, and in 2005 they had a fixed level, established by legislation (Local 
Public Finance Act).  
In Figure 2 we grouped the EU Member States both in relation to the importance of subnational 
taxes and on the basis of tax autonomy. Tax revenues of local budgets include, in this case, also 
revenue from tax sharing arrangements. Their distribution by level of government is taken from 
the Eurostat report, Taxation Trends in the European Union, 2009 edition. 
 
































Thus, we can group the Member States in four categories: 
- states where local governments receive a large share of total taxation and have high autonomy 
in  terms  of  their  determination,  such  as:  Sweden,  Denmark,  Spain,  Belgium,  Germany  and 
Finland; 
- states with a high volume of tax revenue available to subnational governments, but they have 
limited powers in setting those taxes, like: Lithuania, Austria and Romania; 
- states where local authorities have significant powers to set taxes, but their tax revenues are 
modest, such as Luxembourg, Netherlands, Britain, France and Hungary; 
- states where subnational governments have only a small share of total tax revenue and also have 




Fiscal decentralization tendencies are obvious in the majority of EU Member States in the recent 
years, and, thus, increasing subnational governments’ responsibilities requires more tax revenue 
at this level. But since traditional local taxes (property taxes, user charges) are insufficient to 
meet  the  requirements,  many  subcentral  governments  rely  heavily  on  various  tax  sharing 
arrangements  and  intergovernmental  grants.  In  this  setting,  fiscal  decentralization  literature 
shows that the common measures of fiscal decentralization, i.e. the share of local expenditures 
and revenues, clearly tend to overestimate the degree of fiscal decentralization.  
We have shown that regional and local governments in the EU have little discretion over their 
own  taxes.  Typically,  in  the  old  EU  Member  States  subnational  governments  have  superior 
control  over  their  own  taxes.  In  the  federal  states  such  as  Belgium  and  Germany  the  local 
governments have greater autonomy in setting taxes than regional governments, while in Spain 
and Austria regional authorities enjoy greater taxing powers.   
The correlation between different measures of decentralization is weak. For instance, some states 
with high share of local taxes permit only little discretion over the tax rates and tax bases, while 
others enjoy great tax autonomy but have limited fiscal resources. Thus, the design of fiscal 
relations across levels of government varies greatly among EU Member States and there is no 
single pattern of fiscal decentralization. 
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